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KING SECTOR REFORMS AND
BANK CONSOLIDATION:
THE EXPERIENCE OF TURKEY

;

1.O Introduction
ountries reform

their banking
sectors for a
number of

reasons,

including

By
U. M. OGUBUNKA, Ph.D*
guiding policies and 2.O The Features of
$uidelines as well as Banking in Turkey
ensuring that the reform
goals are achieved with Orthodox banking in the
little or no negative Turkish Republic can be
consequences. It is on traced to about 1847
this basis that this paper when representatives of
presents an overview of foreign banks ventured
the banking reform in the into the country to provide
Turkish Republic and the credits to Ottoman
lessons Nigeria could Empire whose financial
learn from it.
had
resources
deteriorated following the
To facilitate a clearer Crimean War. In 1856,
understanding, the paper the Ottoman Bank
is structured into seven (Osmauh Bankasi) which

structural, capitalization
and ownership issues.
Consequently, the
objectives of the reforms sections. The next section served as the Central
can hardly be the same in following this introduction Bank until the 1930s was
all countries.

identifies some of the key

established, with its head
office in London. The first

features of Turkish
banking system pre- set of national banks,
programmes and the reform era of 2OO I, about 24 of them, was
Indeed, the scope of such

strategies adopted in the section three deals on the
execution vary from one drivers of bankin$ reform
country to another. in the country. Section
Expectedly therefore, the four reviews some of the
results of banking reform actions
taken in
programmes differ for a implementing
the
number of factors.
programme while section
five and six respectively,
However, the banking discusses the results and
reform programme of one lessons from the banking
country may provide some reforms in Turkey. A brief
good lessons for others, conclusion in section
especially those intending seven ends the paper.
to, or are already engaged
in such exercise. The

lessons may assist in

tU. M. Ogubunka. Ph.D.

established from 1908 to
1923.

2.L Institutional
Developments (Growth)

Since then, banking
institutions and activities
have grown in Turkey. In
1998, two years before the
2OOO banking crisis which

gave rise to the banking
restructuring / reforms

that started about

2OO 1,

Turkey had about

75

banks. Fifty (50) of them
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were commercial, fifteen
(15) were development
and investment and the
rest were foreign banks.
However. at the end of

netr.l,orks while medium

and small-scale banks autonomous regulatory
concentrate nrainly in and supervisory agency
for banks. The Central
highly populated cities.

2OOI, the number of 2.3 Ownership

banks had reduced to 61 Structure
with 46 of them engaged
in commercial banking. Ownership of banks in
The commercial banks Turkey falls into three

operate as universal

(BRSA) which is an

groups

- state, private and

banks with a broad range foreign. The foreign bzrnks
ol financial services and are of two categories products. They are those established in
however, not perrnitted to Turkey with foreign
engage in leasing and capital resources and
trading in goods or branches of foreign banks
immovables
for in the country. Foreign
banks are subject to
corrunercial purposes
I aws
and
b an king
2.2 Classification by regulations in Turkev like
Type of Senrice and Size. their local counterparts.

Bank of Turkey does not
engage in supervision of
banks, unlike its Nigerian
counterpart - the Central
Bank of Nigeria. BRSA's
job is to "safeguard the
rights and benefits of
depositors and create
proper environment in
which banks and financial
institutions can operate
with market discipline, in
a healthy, efficient and

global competitive
manner,
thus
contributing to the
achievement of long-run

economic growth and
stability of the country".

of It is necessary to also
Providers
banking services in observe that, according to 3.O

Elrivers of T\rrkey's
(2001),
Turkey are classified into Chhibber
state- Banking Restnrcturing
two main sub-sets
owned banks accounted
accepting for a large share (4Oo/o) of 3.1 Overview of the
deposit
(commercial banks) and the banking market in Economic Liberalisation
non-depository banks. As Turkey. Consequently, of 198Os
the names imply, deposit their activities impacted
accepting banks are greatly on the banking The objective of Turkey's
permitted to receive system.
economic liberalization in
deposits liom the public.
the 198Os was to integrate
The non-depository banks 2.4 Regulatory
the country's economy
are not allowed by law to Authorities of the with world markets. The
receive deposits from the Turkish Banking system strategy to achieve this
public.
They are
was hinged on moving
essentially development Banks in Turkey are towards a free market
governed under the economy. The economic
and investment banks.
general provisions of the liberalizatior-r of the 1980s,
Another feature of the Turkish Commercial led to many changes in
banking system in Turkey Code. Banks Act and the banking system.
is that banking various tax laws. They are These changes include the
institutions fall into large, also subject to special liberalization of interest
medium and small sizes. provisions by the Banking and foreign exchange
Tire large-scale banks Regulation
and rates, entry of new banks
have nation-wide branch Supervision Agency including foreign ones,
17
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venturing abroad by banking

system,

conditions were also very

Turkish banks through especially poor financial weak. Indeed, their
the opening of overseas conditions of the state- excess liquidity needs
branches
and owned banks. Indeed, affected the entire
establishment of the inter-

some of the banks became

banking

were supposed to be the

they induced in

system

bank money market by distressed and were negatively. I'here was the
the Central Bank of transferred to the Savings need for their reform and
Turkey to regulate Deposit Insurance Fund restructuring to reduce
banking system liquidity. (SDIF). The banks which the level of financial risk

There was also the
establishment of special

finance institutions,

especially Islamic banJdng

hub and catalysts of

the

banking system.

econornic activities could

no longer support the 3.2.2 Resolution

institutions, within the economy. The real sector Banks

of SDIF

could not bon'ow money
at prevailing cut-throat As a result of the crisis in
Noble as the policy and interest rates to enhance both the economy and the
strategy were, however, growth in the economy. banking sector, some
some of the results that There was general decline banks had financial
followed affected the in the level of economic problems that warranted
economy and the banking activities. Turkey's their transfer to the
system adversely due to banking ran into murky Savings
Deposit
(SDIF)
poor implementation and waters in the early 20OOs. Insurance Fund
for
sequencing of the To redress these problems resolution. From 1997 liberalisation. For the banking restructuring 2OO3, 21 banks featured
instance, interest rates and reforms became in the portfolio of SDIF
slgrrocketed to over 100%o. necessary in Turkey.
needin$
remedial
Inflation
and
attention.
unemployment rates 3.2 The Pillars of
worsened. Illiquidity of Tlrrkish Banking Sector 3.2.3 Strengthening of
state-owned banks which Restructuring Programme Private Banks.
accounted for a large
percentage of the market The banking reforms or The number and impact of
negatively affected the restructuring in the private banks were
banking system; the level Turkey Republic was increasing in the Turkish
of savings became low due anchored on four pillars. economy. The free market
economy adopted in the
to low levels of income. These were:
1980s also signalled
There was also low
demand for financial 3.2.L Restructuring of increasing private sector
assets due to high cost of the state-owned Banks. participation. The private
banks were expected to
intermediation.
As stated earlier, state- play significant roles in
3.1.1 Major Problems of owned banks accounted supporting the real sector
the Banking System for sizeable nercentage of growth. To Lre able to meet
the banking market in this challenge they needed
Before zOOt.
These probiems, among Turkey. Unfortunately, to be strengthened,
others resulted to they were not only especially in terms of
weaknesses in the inefficient; their financial incre as e d capitalizatio n.
period.

18
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3.2.4 Strengthening of
the Regulatory and
Supenrisory Erameworks

In order to ensure the
success of the reform
exercise, the need for
strengthening the

regulatory
-

and

supervisory bodies was
identified. Strengthening
them would also provide
the principles and
procedures for the entire
programme such that it

could be properly

managed, monitored and

supervised towards the
intended objectives.

4.O Implementation of
the Banking Restnrcturing
Progf,amme in Ttrrkey

A number of

steps

(including the following)
were taken by the
appropriate agencies of
the Turkish government
to carr5r out the banking

allocation, the Law No. 4.2 Resolution of SDIF
4603 of November 25, Banks
2OOO was enacted.
Furthermore, on April 3O, The SDIF, being the
2OOL, the Council of deposit insurer, took over
Ministers decided that some distressed banks
existing duty losses that had significant
suffered by state banks financial problems. These
should be cancelled. distressed banks were
That decision ensured resolved using some good
that such losses were rnix of resolution options.

completely wiped-off

of the distress
of cash and bills. resolution measures

through the introduction Some

Similarly, the short-term include mergers, sales
liabilities of state banks and closures. For
to the Central Bank of instance, Egebank,
Turkey were signifi cantly Yurtbank, T. Tutunculer
reduced while others Bank fYasarbank), Bank
were brought to zero. Kapital and Ulusal Bank
With regard to were merged with
strengthening the capital Sumerbank. On the other
position of these banks, hand, Bank Ekspres and
cash and securities were Demirbank were sold
introduced into them.
while Turk Ticaret Bank
was closed down.
It is also noteworthy that
inefficient and non- Some other measures
profitable branches were taken to redeem the
closed down and a Banks were provision of

sector restructuring sizeable number of
programme, which employees were
corunenced in 2OO1.
disengaged
Furthermore,
4.L ResolutionofState- independent auditing
O$med Banls
firm was hlred for

As earlier pointed out,
financial status of stateowned banks was very
poor, especially because
they sustained significant
losses due to duty losses.

To stop the state from
charging state-owned
banks with new financial

responsibilities without
making prior budget

deposit and capital

supports to the banks by

SDIF; their overnight
obligations, except those
with the Central Bank,

were eliminated; their
external auditing of state short-term liabilities with
owned banks. The the Central Bank were

restructuring of state
banks also saw the

significantly reduced; bad
assets were transferred to

transfer of Emlak Bank to SDIF
Collection
ZiraatBank as at July 6, Department. As in the
2OOI. All these actions case of state banks, a
were taken to ensure a Joint Management Board
healthy banking system was put in place to
with less risks.
restructure the banks
operatiorrally. Ultimately,
their number of branches
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and employees

was into shares; the sale of Procedures for Special
reduced.
banks' shares taken over Audit along with the
by the Savings Deposit report of the independent
4.3 Strengthening of Insurance Fund (SDIF) auditing institution on the
Frivate Banks
and the conversion of Iinancial statement;
subordinated debts to (ii) the determined
The Banking Regulation capital.
capital adequacy ratio;
and Supervision Agency
(iii) the
required
(BRSA) which was It should be noted that the amount of capital to reach
created, courtesy of the regulation does not affect t}re 8o/o capital adequacy
Banks Act No. 4389 of banks taken overby SDIF, ratio, that is, if the ratio
1999 developed the public owned banks, is below 8olo;

"Regulation on the special

finance (iv) the need to increase
institutions, development capital or to issue
of Banking Sector and investment banks subordinated debts; and
Recapitalisation Scheme" and branches of foreign (v) any other measures
. The objective of the banks operating in that need to be taken.
Principles and Procedures

regulation "is to lay down Turkey.

the principles and
procedures for the According to the
recapitalisation scheme regulation, capital
designed for private enhancement by banks in
owned deposit-taking Turkey was not
banks incorporated in generalized and no

What this means is that
banks in Turkey are
audited and evaluated for,

essentially

capital
adequacy. Only those
that are below the
Turkey \Mith the ultimate specific amount was internationally accepted
aim to establish a sound imposed on all banks. 8olo level are mandatorily
and transparent banking On the contrary, banks required to increase their
system".
In accordance with Article

were required to maintain
8% capital adequacy ratio.

The ones that

were

capitalization.

Another significant

4 of Banks Act No 4389, required to recapitalise revelation from the
the regulation provided were those whose capital regulation is that banks
for: the details of the adequacy ratio was below which are unable to meet
general assembly to be 8o/o.
the required minimum
held by banks; procedures
capital adequacy ratic
regarding an increase or For banks to know their from their legal reserves
decrease of the banks' positions, the BRSA, after and attempting to
capital; the measures that an evaluation of a bank, increase the capital
need to be taken based on was expected to noti$r the adequacy may apply to
assessments of the Bank's Board of Directors BRSA to participate in the
Banking Regulation and on the following areas:
sector
banking
Supervision Agency; the
financial
transfer period of shares (i) the
which are subject to the statements of the bank
capital increase; the audited according to the
issuance of convertible criteria and procedures
bonds and triggers for the defined in the Regulation
conversion of these bonds on the Principles and
20

recapitalisation scheme.
The Agency can:

(a) inject capital

to
reach the tier one capital
ratio. The capita-l injection
by the Fund cannot

llJune 2005
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Sector Law No 4743 was
the shareirolders. The 4.4 Strengthening of enacted in 2OO2, that is,
Fund would pay net book the Regulatory And a few years following the
Supenrisory Framework enactment of Regulation
value for the shares.
(bl provide
on the Principles and
sribordinated debts in the According to Banks Procedures of Banking
form of 7 -year convertible Association of Turkey Sector Recapitalisation
bond to reach capital (2005), strengthening the Scheme, Banks Act No
and 4389 in 1999. To
regulatory
adequacy ratio of 9o/o.
supervisorlr system encourage mergers, Some
The regulation also during the banking legal changes were
provides for mergers and reforms manifested in enacted in June 2OOl
acquisitions. In Ariicle 24 decisions and measures under Regulation on Bank
it provides that "private taken in the areas of: Mergers and Transfer.
exchange
comnercial ban.hs with an foreign
asset market share below exposures, capital Similarly, tax incentives
1% (as of September200l) adequacy, internal control were given and the
can apply for Tier one and risk management, Central Bank put in place
capital contribution by the lending limits, conditions a monitoring system to
Fund, provided that they to be met by bank owrlers, access weekly data on
meet this threshold bank ownership control in deposit interest rates
through mergers and transfer of shares, being applied by banks.
acquisitions. Banks with consolidated and cross- As a way of reducing
an asset market share border supervision of transaction cost and to
below lolo should apply to banks,
accounting encourage banks to
the Board for pre-approval standards for financial mobilize deposits, the
for mergers and disclosure purposes, Central Bank comrnenced
acquisitions, until April prudential reporting and the payment of interest on
2OO2" .
There was loan loss provisioning. banksl required reserves
however, no provisions as
in lira deposits.
;
exceed

the contribution of

to how mergers

In addition. the SDIF
acquisitions would be which used to be an q.O . Some Positive
undertaken, perhaps appendage of BRSA Results of Bank
because the issue of gained autonomy (Act No Restructuring and
and

,,

rnerger and acquisition 5O2O of 2003); savings ConsolidationinT\rrkey
was not a must for the deposit
insurance
I
coverage
which
used
to
be
Some
the
of
outcomes
of
hanks.
lOOo/o was reduced to 50 the banking sector
As may be appreciated, billion TL (50,0O0 new reforms in Turkey have
the above provisions Turkish Lira) to decrease been outstanding and are
opened reasonable the moral }:razard effect; highlighted hereunder:
windows for private banks risk-based, as opposed to r
The number of
in financial difficulties to rule-based supervision, banks have decreased
was initiated.
from 75 in 2O0O to 48 in
resolve their problems.
2OO4, that is about 360lo
The Restrtrcturing of
Of the 21 distressed
Debts to the trinancial r
banks transferred to SDIF
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for resolution, L3 (620/ol
have been merged, 5 I
in terms of
{24o/o) sold and 2 (LOo/o) profitability, returns on
closed as at December 31,

2OO4. The only

remaining

one

is

assets improved from -5. 7
(2001) to 2,1 QOA$ while
returns on average equity
rose to 13.8 (2OO4) from-

E

Total cost of the

structuring prograrrune
was about US$47.2 billion
with about $39.3 billion or
830/o from the public purse
rvhile $Z.g billion or l7o/o
from the private banks.
re

Bayindirbank, which is a
bridge bank put in place 58.4 (2OOl). The stateto handle distressed owned banks that hitherto 6.0 Lessons from
banks.
made losses have started ?urkey's Banhing Sector v
Refonrrs for Nigeria
making profit.

r
The number of
bank branches trave r

Besides the above Turkey's experience in
sector
reduced from 6908 (2OO1) developments, other banking
to 6106 (2OO4). That results of the reform restructuring and
consotridation, no doubt
means that about l2o/o of exercise showed in the:

bank branches were I
Inrprovement in the
closed;
liquidity position of
l!

Total number of

bank employees declined
by 14,246 persons or
about lOo/o, from 137,495
(2001)

to L23,249

I

the capitaX adequacy ratio reforrns mid 2004.
to of 28.2o/o for private banks
Perhaps, the first lesson rc
as at end of 2OO4.
Turkey's
I
R.educing interest that
restnucturing was, frorn
to rates;

nt is important
note thatwhile about 41olo
of the bank employees in
2OO I worked in stateoumed comnercial banks,
47o/o worked in privately
owned co[lmercial banks.
However, by 2OO4, the
ratio changed to 31olo for
state-owned commercial
banks and 600/o for
privately
owned
banks.
corrunercial

I

banks, hence reduced either considering sirnilar
exercise or have already
liquidity risk;
embarked on one. This
!
Enhanced
capitalization of banks includes Nigeria that
resulting, for instance, in commeRced banking

(2003)

before increasing
'j.27,163 (2OO4l.

provi.des some lessons to
other countries that are

Stabilizing foreign the on-set, properiy
exchange rate and focused to address
reduction in foreign weaknesses observed in
the banking sector. It
exchange exposures;

I

r

Declined

dominance of state- oumed
banks in the system;

chose four targets for the
exercise viz, state-owned

banks, private-owned

banks, distressed banks
f
Increasing
and and strengthening the
relevance
an6'
contribution of privateiy regulatory
owned banks

I

R.eduction in
financial risks in the

supervisory f,ramework.
With that type of
compartmentalization, it
was easy to have f,ocus,
determine necessary
actions to be taken and

Non-performing banking sector
Narrowing of
credits (gross) declined I
(2001)
and increasing
margins
from 13,886YTLM
measure the outcomes.
to 6,301 (2OO4), that is by competition
Evident growth in
about 55o/o; a substantial r
The second lesson is that
improvement in the the banking sector
although there was need
quality of banks' assets;

I
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for banks' recapitalistion,

was borne by public

only banks with capitai treasury.
adequacy ratio below B%o

of AMCs made

for

it possible

private sector

participation.

Another important lesson
is that there was no Finally, it is noteworthy
Consequently, there was compulsion on banks to that the Central Bank of
no universal requirement consolidate via mergers Turkey is not directly
for all banks to increase and acquisitions or indeed involved in the supervision
capital b), a common any other form of of banks. This role, which

were mandatorily required
to bring same within line.

amount irrespective of arrangement. Banks is being played by the
their capital adequacy were at liberty to chose Banking Regulation and
ratio. This is in line \Mith whether or not to merge, Supervision Agency
acquire or be acquired. (BRSA) makes it possible
best practice.
That is one of the beauties for the Central Bank to
Again, despite the of private sector freedom. concentrate on its core
reforms, the structure of

functions.

banking institutions To ameliorate the
largely remains the same liquidation of many 7.O
with banks of large, banks, and the

medium and small sizes consequent negative
impact, a bridge bank,
co-existing.
Bayindirbank, was
It is equally noteworthy incorporated to take on
that the government banks w'ith less chances
ensured that its banks of survival and prepare
were strengthened by them for acquisition,
cancelling existing duty merger, sale or closure.
losses suffered by the This accounted for the low
banks, enhancing their rate of casualties - only 2
capital through the banks were closed - and
introduction of cash and that gave confidence to
securities and lirniting its the banking public.
financial requirements
from the banks to prior There is no doubt that the
_budgetary allocations. opportunity created for
There was also the transfer of bad loans
introduction of guidelines, in banks to a department
-laws and regulations as of SDIF for management
well as tax incentives to needs to be mentioned
support the reforms and because it helped in the
motivate operators. reform process. This
Indeed, the government arrangement was made
gave explicit support to despite the plans to
Asset
ensure the success of the establish
programme. A clear Management Company
evidence is the huge cost (AMC). And a further
of the programme that lesson is that the rules
guiding the establishment
23

Conclusion

The banking reform that
started in 2001 in the
Turkish Republic appears
to have addressed most of
the identified problems
that motivated it. Thus,
it brought about enhanced

capital and capital
adequacy ratios and
significant improvement

in banks' liquidity.
Indeed, it also culminated

into a consolidated
banking sector with

reduction in the number

of banks and bank

branches as well as the
dominance of state-owned
banks in the economy.

trvidences following the
exercise further point to
banks' profitability looking
upward and minimization
of financial risks in the

economy. Furthermore,
interest and

with

exchange rates reduction
and moderation, the real
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sector operators have
once again, resorted to References

banks for investment
funds, thus, generating
and improving employrnent
and productivity.
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Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (2OO5).
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The foregoing therefore,
suggest that the pay-off
from the reform justifies Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. Annex 1:
the exercise. However, as Developments in Structural Reforms, Monetary Policy
has always been the Report.
experience, the seeming

end of one reform Chhibber Ajay (2001). "Bank Restructuring in
produces new challenges

Emerging Markets: An Institutional Perspective".

that may necessitate

further reforms. Thus, as Yardim Dilek (2003). "Banking Sector in Turkey", a
the Turkish Banking paper presentecl at the 24th Annual Conference on
sector stabllizes and U.S. - Turkis
perhaps groWs, it is
imperative that it should
prepare for new reforms to

meet challenges in the
global banking market.
This is particularly true

with regard to its capacity
for mega businesses and
the privatization of stateowned banks, three of

which were still in

existence as at end of
2004.
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